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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT JAMES SALMON and 
TOMMY LEE BENWELL, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 16591 
(and No. 16 7 2 3) 
REPLY TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TO PROVE ENTRAPMENT, IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE DEFENDANT 
TO ALLEGE THAT THE ENTRAPPING PARTY WAS AN "AGENT" OF THE 
POLICE. 
It is clear that under any circumstances and under 
any test of entrapment currently in use in the United 
States, there is no entrapment or in other words no such 
defense against prosecution and conviction, when the 
party who dealt with the accused was a private party 
acting at his own initiative and not prompted or encour-
aged by the police. The problem arises, however, that it 
is unclear what degree of relationship between the govern-
ment and such an individual is required before the 
• 
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individual's acts are imputed to the government for the 
purpose of the entrapment defense. The respondent points 
out that there was evidence at the trial of the appellant 
which indicated that the informer in this case was not a 
"government agent" and "did not work for" the police. 
Respondent alleges that therefore, since the informer was 
not a police ''agent," there could be no entrapment under 
either the subjective or objective test. Respondent's 
Brief, p.7. 
For the purpose of this case, however, Section 76-2-
303 (1) is controlling on this issue. Though that section 
does not define the necessary relationship between the 
police and their informer, it does state that entrapment 
arises when the person who deals with the suspect is "a 
law enforcement officer or a person directed by or acting 
in co-operation with the officer . For a person to 
act in cooperation with police, it is not necessary that 
the person be an "agent" of the police, in the sense that 
that word is often used. Such a person need not be acting 
under the direction of the police, need not be paid by the 
police, and need not be "working for" the police, but 
merely acting in cooperation with them. 
It is true that the Court in State v. Taylor, 599 
P.2d 496 (Utah 1979) did use the term, "agent." That 
would be an appropriate word in that case, since the 
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informer in that case was a paid employee of the governm t en , 
an undercover police agent receiving direction from and com-
pensation from the police. However, the use of that term 
must be qualified by the understanding that it can be used 
by one person to refer to someone who is a compensated 
employee or representative of the government, and by another 
person to mean someone who is merely acting in cooperation 
with the government for the purpose of entrapping a criminal. 
In this case, the evidence was sufficient to establish that 
the informer, Mr. Flowers, was not only acting in cooper-
ation with the police but to a certain extent was following 
their directions, and was therefore an entrapping "person" 
for the purpose of the entrapment defense. 
POINT II. 
ON THIS APPEAL IT IS PROPER FOR THE COURT TO APPLY THE 
"OBJECTIVE STANDARD" OF ENTRAPMENT, AS EXPRESSED IN SECTION 
76-2-303(1) U.C.A., TO DETERMINE WEETHER IT WAS ESTABLISHED 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT 
ENTRAPPED. 
The Respondent, in its brief, does not take issue 
with the manner in which the Appellant describes the posture 
of this case before the Utah Supreme Court. As the appel-
lant stated in his brief, the proper question on appeal is 
whether it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
appellant was not entrapped. According to the cases cited 
in Appellant's brief, if it is shown that, as a matter of 
law, the only reasonable view of the evidence is that the 
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conduct of the police was such as to rai'se a reasonable 
doubt that the appellant was entrapped, then the appellant 
is entitled to a reversal here. See State v. Hansen, 588 
P.2d 164 {Utah 1978). 
The point of divergence between the appellant's and 
respondent's arguments is, rather, what standard of entrap-
ment is properly applicable in this case. As both parties 
agree, Section 76-2-303 of the Criminal Code had never been 
interpreted to require the application of the "objective 
test" of entrapment until August 7, 1979, the date of the 
Taylor decision. State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979). 
Prior to that date, the Utah Supreme Court had interpreted 
the language of Section 76-2-303 to embody the "subjective 
test." Appellant in this case was arrested, tried, and 
convicted before the filing of the Taylor decision, and 
the respondent therefore argues that the ruling in Taylor 
should not be applied retroactively to the appellant's 
conviction and that the subjective test should therefore 
be applied by the Utah Supreme Court at this level of 
appeal. Appellant submits that this reading of the law is 
erroneous because the Taylor decision is properly appli-
cable to all cases pending on direct appeal at the time 
the decision was filed, including this case. Further, 
even if the Taylor decision itself is not retroactive to 
that extent, the appellant is not precluded from making 
the same arguments that were made by the appellant in Taylor 
-4-
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and obtaining the same result without direct reliance upon 
the ruling of the Court in Taylor. 
Concerning the retroactivity of the Taylor decision, 
it should first be made clear that there is no statutory 
or constitutional constraint upon the court to make its 
decision either retroactive or prospective only. From the 
cases, it appears that whenever the court judicially adopts 
a new interpretation of a constitution or construction of 
a statute, it is free to make the application of that new 
approach prospective only or retroactive to whatever extent 
it chooses. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 733, 
8 6 S . Ct . l 77 2 , l 7 8 l , l 6 L . Ed . 2 d 8 8 2 ( 19 6 6 ) . 
The general rule, however, is that in subsequent cases 
a court, trial or appellate, should apply the law in exist-
ence at the time that that court itself considers the case. 
The rule dates back to the decision of United States v. 
Schooner Peggy, l Cranch 103, 2 L.Ed. 49 (1801). In that 
case, Chief Justice Marshall stated: 
It is in the general true that the province of an 
appellate court is only to enquire whether a 
judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But 
if subsequent to the judgment and before the 
decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes 
and positively changes the rule which governs'. 
the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied 
... It is true that in mere private cases 
between individuals, a court will and ought to 
struggle hard against a construction which.will, 
by a retrospective operation, affect the rights 
of parties, but in great national concerns · · ~ 
the court must decide according to existing law ' 
and if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, 
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rightful when rendered, but which 
affirmed but in violation of law 
must be set aside. Id. at 110. ' 
cannot be 
the judgment 
The rule of United States v. Schooner Peggy continues to 
be the general rule accepted in the courts today. Bradley 
v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 94 s.ct. 
2 0 0 6, 4 0 L. Ed. 2d 4 7 6 ( 19 7 4) . 
The question then becomes, in what cases or circum-
stances should the courts deviate from the rule that each 
court should apply the law as it exists at the time its 
own decision is rendered. The Respondent argues that the 
Supreme Court cases of Johnson v. New Jersey, supra., 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed 
2d 601, (1965), and Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 
89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248 (1969) should be controlling 
here and require that the Taylor decision be applied pros-
pectively only, with the result that this appellant should 
not have the benefit of that decision because his conviction 
occurred prior to its filing. 
Johnson, Linkletter, and Desist, however, are cases 
which illustrate a specific and narrow exception from the 
general rule, which ··is not applicable to the present case· 
In Linkletter, the court considered the narrow question 
whether the exclusionary rule of Mapp, requiring the 
exclusion of evidence obtained in a search or seizure which 
violates the Fourth Amendment, should be applied 
-6-
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retrospectively to cases finally decided prior to the 
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 
6 L . Ed . 2 d 1 0 8 1 ( 19 61) . See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 u.s. 
at 619, 85 S.Ct. at 1732. The Court recognized that a 
purely prospective treatment would not even allow the 
application of a new rule to the parties before the court, 
since even the immediate parties are always tried before 
the filing of the rule-setting appellate decision. There-
fore, there will generally be some retroactive application, 
i.e, to the immediate parties to an appeal, in every case. 
To determine to what further extent a new rule should be 
retroactively applied, the Court considered the history of 
the retroactivity rules in the United States and came to 
this conclusion, based upon the chronological relation-
ships of certain events: 
Under our cases it appears (1) that a change in law 
will be given effect while a case is on direct 
review, United States v. Schooner Peggy, supra, 
and (2) that the effect of the subsequent ruling of 
invalidity on prior final judgments when colla-
terally attacked is subject to no set "principle 
of absolute retroactive invalidity" but depends 
upon a conside~ation of "particular relations * * * 
and particular conduct * * * or rights claimed to 
have become vested, or status of prior determina-
tions deemed to have finality"; and of "public 
policy in the light of the nature both of the. 
statute and of its previous application." ~ 
County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 
308 U.S., at 374, 60 s.ct. at 319. Quoted at 
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 627, 85 S.Ct. 
at 1736. [Emphasis added). 
Linkletter thus made a clear distinction between cases 
which are pending on direct review at the time of the 
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rule-changing decision and cases which have been finally 
decided and which are sought to be collaterally reversed. 
The Court indeed took a rather absolute stance toward cases 
pending on direct review, requiring that new rules and 
interpretations be applied to such cases, while as to cases 
in which the new rule is sought to be collaterally applied, 
whether such application is possible depends upon a number 
of policy questions. 
The subsequent discussion in the opinion, dealing with 
the particular policy questions to be asked, pertains only 
to petitioners on collateral attack. The petitioner in 
Linkletter was a habeas corpus petitioner who sought to 
have his conviction overturned on the basis of ~- His 
conviction had become final through a judgment of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, in February, 1960, while Mapp was 
announced in June, 1961. Though the Court recognized the 
general rule of retroactivity, and cited cases in which 
new rules had been retroactively applied even to judgments 
finalized before the promulgation of the rule, it felt 
that under the particular circumstances of the case, retro-
active application was neither required by the Constitution 
nor expedient in terms of policy or justice. But again, 
its decision was limited to the case in which a final judg-
ment is collaterally attacked on the basis of a rule pro-
mulgated after the final judgment: 
-8-
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All that we decide today is that thouqh the 
error complained of might be fundamental it is not 
of the nature requiring us to overturn all final 
convictions based upon it. [Emphasis added~ 
U.S. at 639-640, 85 S.Ct. at 1743. 
The same circumstances appear in Johnson v. New Jersey, 
supra. There, a criminal defendant petitioned to the Unit~ 
States Supreme Court for post-conviction relief after the 
New Jersey Supreme Court had made his conviction final in 
1960. The petitioner sought to have his conviction over-
turned on the grounds that his confession had been used 
in violation of the rules later promulgated by Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, 
and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694, in 1964 and 1966 respectively. In citing the 
Linkletter case, the Court recognized the narrow limitation 
of that decision to collateral attacks and its non-applicatw 
to direct appeals pending at the time of Mapp: 
Our holdings in Linkletter and Tehan were necessari0 
limited to convictions which had become final by 
the time Mapp and Griffin were rendered. Decisions 
prior to Lirlkletter and Tehan had already established 
without discussion that Mapp and Griffin applied to 
cases still on direct appeal at the time they were 
announced. 384 U.S. at 732, 86 s.ct. at 1780. 
The Court then concluded that for policy reasons, the 
Miranda and Escobedo decisions could not be invoked retro-
actively either by petitioners on collateral review or by 
appellants whose direct appeals were pending at the times 
of those decisions. The latter ruling was dictum in the 
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case, however, since the facts dealt only with a collateral 
petitioner, as indeed the Court recognized by stating: 
Of course, States are still entirely free to effec-
tuate under their own law stricter standards than 
those we have laid down and to apply those standards 
in a broader range of cases than is required by 
this decision. 384 U.S. at 733, 86 S.Ct. at 1781. 
Desist v. United States, supra., is a much more diffi-
cult case to square with the general rule of United States 
v. Schooner Peggy, supra. Desist agreed with Johnson on 
the proposition that new constitutional rules affecting 
criminal procedure are not required by the Constitution 
nor by statute to be applied either prospectively or retro-
spectively, even in regard to cases currently pending on 
direct review. On the grounds of policy considerations, 
the Court therefore held that the exclusionary rule of Katz 
r v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 
576 (1967) should not be available even to appellants whose 
cases were pending on direct review at the time Katz was 
decided. Since the appellant in Desist was in fact an 
appellant whose case was pending on review at the time of 
the Katz decision, the holding of Desist was a clear 
departure from the _,general rule of Schooner Peggy and not 
merely dictum as in Johnson. 
However, the Desist case points out additional reasons 
why the Linkletter, Johnson, and Desist decisions are 
merely excep~ional cases and not relevant to the questions 
-10-
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in this case. First, all three cases dealt with consti-
tutional rules for the exclusion of evidence. In deter-
mining whether they should be applied to cases pending on 
appeal at the time the rules were promulgated, the primary 
factor used by the courts to argue against retroactivity 
is the simple observation that the purpose of such rules 
is to deter police conduct, not to exonerate the defen-
dant, and that since the rule is promulgated at a time 
when past police conduct has already occurred, the retro-
active application of the rule would have no deterrent 
effect. As stated in Desist: 
Foremost among these factors is the purpose to be 
served by the new constitutional rule. This 
criterion strongly supports prospectivity for a 
decision amplifying the evidentiary exclusionary 
rule . "all of the cases * * * requiring the 
exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on 
the necessity for an effective deterrent to illegal 
police action. * * * We cannot say that this 
purpose would be advanced by making the rule retro-
spective. The misconduct of the police * * * has 
already occurred and will not be corrected by 
releasing the prisoners involved." 381 U.S. at 
636, 637, 85 S.Ct. at 1741. Quoted at 394 U.S. 
249, 89 S.Ct. at 1033, 1034. 
Further, Linkletter, Johnson, and Desist all dealt with 
the retroactivity or prospectivity of constitutional rules 
of criminal procedure, and not with statutory provisions 
defining substantive defenses and burdens of defendants. 
As pointed out in Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 93 S.Ct. 
876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (1973), different considerations apply 
when the rules in question affect more than the procedures 
-11-
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to be followed at a criminal trial. In Robinson, a 
criminal habeas corpus petitioner, whose conviction was 
final before the filing of the decision of Waller v. Florida 
397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970), sought 
after the decision in Waller to have his conviction over-
turned on the grounds that under the double jeopardy rules 
of Waller, his conviction constituted double jeopardy. 
The Court examined the Linkletter decision, together with 
its progeny, and concluded: 
Prior to this Court's 1965 decision in Linkletter 
v. Walker ... there would have been less doubt 
concerning the retroactivity of the Waller holding. 
For, until that time, both the common law and our 
own decisions recognized a general rule of retro-
spective effect for the constitutional decisions 
of this Court . . subject to limited exceptions 
. In Linkletter, the Court, declaring that 
it was charting new ground (381 U.S., at 628 and 
n. 13, 85 S.Ct., at 1737) held that with respect 
to new constitutional interpretations involving 
criminal rights "the Constitution neither prohibits 
nor requires retro-spective effect." ... We do 
not believe that this case readily lends itself 
to the analysis established in Linkletter . . . . 
Linkletter ... dealt with those constitutional 
interpretations bearing on the use of evidence or 
on a particular mode of trial. Those procedural 
rights and methods of conducting trials, however, 
do not encompass all of the rights found in the 
first eight Amendments. Guarantees that do not 
relate to these procedural rules cannot, for retro-
activity purposes be lumped conveniently together 
in terms of analysis. Linkletter indicated, for 
instance, that only those procedural rules affect-
ing "the very integrity of the factfinding process" 
would be given retrospective effect ... In terms 
of some nonprocedural guarantees, this test is 
simply not appropriate. * * * 
The Court then held that the guarantee against double 
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jeopardy is sufficiently different from the constitutional 
rules discussed in Linkletter to be analyzed by different 
methods. Since the right against double jeopardy has the 
effect of preventing the trial of the defendant from taking 
place at all, while the exclusionary rules discussed in 
Linkletter, Johnson, and Desist are merely procedural rules 
affecting the admissibility of evidence and the conduct of 
the trial but not giving rise to affirmative defenses or 
bars to prosecution, the analysis of Linkletter is not 
sufficient. Accordingly, the Court held that the general 
retroactivity rule should apply and found that the double 
jeopardy rule of Waller applies retroactively to judgments 
finalized before the rendering of that decision, and to 
cases pending on appeal at the time of the decision. 
Respondent argues that since the entrapment defense 
has as its purpose the deterrence of illegal police conduct, 
the rules of Linkletter, Johnson, and Desist should apply 
here. However, that argument overlooks a number of 
important factors. While those cases dealt with consti-
tutional rules regulating the procedure of criminal trials 
and affecting the admissibility of evidence, the entrap-
ment defense is not merely a procedural rule. Proof of 
entrapment does not result merely in the exclusion of 
evidence which was obtained as a result of such police 
conduct. Rather, it results in the complete exoneration 
of the accused. Entrapment is not a mere procedural or 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidentiary question; it is a matter going to the criminal 
responsibility of the defendant. Under the subjective 
theory of entrapment, it could certainly not be said that 
the purpose of the defense was to deter improper police 
conduct, since as long as the defendant's predisposition 
was shown, any police conduct would be tolerated, no 
matter how unseemly. Although the focus of the objective 
test is directly on the conduct of the government officials, 
it still cannot be said that the only purpose of the rule 
is to deter certain police conduct, since the rule has the 
effect of exonerating the defendant completely and not 
merely of excluding tainted evidence. The entrapment 
defense is of such a nature that the rules and analysis of 
the cases above are simply not applicable. 
Furthermore, even if the Taylor rule were to be analyzed 
on policy grounds for the purpose of determining whether 
it should be applied prospectively only, it is clear that 
the application of that rule to those cases pending on 
direct review at the time of its filing would work no 
burden or injustice upon the State. Appellant does not 
contend that the rule should be available to petitioners 
whose judgments have been finalized as of the time of the 
Taylor decision, since that would occasion unnecessary and 
difficult administrative problems. Rather, the availability 
of the rule to the appellant here and to others whose 
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appeals were pending at the time of the Taylor decision 
merely places their rights on a par with those of the appel-
lant in the Taylor case itself. What justice could there 
be in allowing one defendant to pursue innovative argu-
ments to a successful result and denying another defendant 
the benefits of that result merely because his case follow~ 
the other by a short period of time? 
Cases dealing with the retroactive effect of new entrap-
ment rules have generally held them to be available to 
defendants whose cases were pending on appeal. In State 
v. Branam, 390 A.2d 1186 (Sup.Ct.App.Div.N.J. 1978) the 
Supreme Court of Jew Jersey had previously adopted a rule 
providing that entrapment is established, regardless of the 
predisposition of the defendant, whenever the police 
furnished a defendant with narcotics for the purpose of 
inducing him to sell it to an undercover agent. The defen-
dant in the instant case had engaged in unlawful acts priw 
to that decision, but was tried after the decision and 
sought to have the court instruct the jury in accordance 
with the new rule. The trial court refused to do so. On 
appeal, the Court stated: 
. the State herein contends that because ~ 
was handed down 18 months after the commission of 
the instant offenses, a charge in conformity with 
that opinion would give to it an impermissible 
retroactive effect. The State asserts that ~ 
merely sets forth a prophylactic rule designed to 
deter unacceptable police conduct and that, because 
the police action here is beyond deterrence, 
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retroactive application of the rule would be mean-
ingless: It adds that the police here had also 
relied in good faith upon the state of the law 
prior to Talbot which gave no indication that such 
conduct contravened "fundamental fairness." We 
disagree .. Without enumerating the many consider-
ations which may determine whether or not a deci-
sion is to have retroactive effect, and the many 
decisions concerning them, we determine that the 
Talbot rule applies to all cases then pending for 
trial or on direct appeal. 390 A.2d at 1189. 
Thus, the court recognized that the new entrapment rule 
should apply to cases pending on appeal at the time the 
new rule was promulgated, in spite of the fact that the 
police conduct in any particular case might be beyond the 
reach of any deterrent effect that the new rule might have. 
Since the reasons for making the entrapment rule retroactive 
to that extent do not depend upon the date of the alleged 
police conduct but rather upon the date of the promulgation 
of the new rule, the retroactivity would include cases 
pending on appeal as well as cases currently awaiting trial. 
Similarly, the State of Michigan has held that even 
though the adoption of a new entrapment rule was to be 
given prospective application only, such prospective appli-
cation included application to cases pending on appeal at 
the time of the promulgation of the new rule. In People 
v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. Sept. 18, 1973), the 
Supreme Court of Michigan adopted the objective test of 
entrapment. Later cases established that the decision of 
that case was to have prospective application only. People 
v. Auer, 227 N.W.2d 528 (Mich. 1975). Nonetheless, in 
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People v. Alford, 251 N.W.2d 314 (Ct.App.Mich. 1977), the 
court held that appellants whose offenses had occurred 
prior to the date of the Turner decision were entitled to 
the new rule in all proceedings held after the date of that 
decision, including the appellate hearings. Such applicatior. 
is literally "prospective," but is also "retroactive" in 
the sense that cases pending on appeal at the time of the 
decision would be included, although some of the "pro-
ceedings" in any particular case might already have occurr~. 
Finally, a similar approach was taken in United States 
v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1976) in which the Ninth 
Circuit Court held that the adoption of a new rule allowing 
a defendant in the federal courts to allege entrapment 
without first admitting the alleged offense would be 
applicable to all cases pending on direct appeal at the 
time the new rule was promulgated. 
In light of these cases and arguments, the Appellant 
concedes that the application of the Taylor rule to this 
hearing on appeal is not mandated by statute, constitution, 
or the Taylor opinion itself or by any later decision 
construing it. However, it is clear that considering these 
cases and this particular entrapment rule, it is entirely 
proper for the Utah Supreme Court to give Taylor effect to 
all cases pending on direct appeal at the time that decision 
was rendered. Whether such treatment is "prospective" or 
~etrospective" is merely a matter of semantics, the 
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important factor being that justice is best served by 
this Court applying today the rule of law that exists today. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF TAYLOR IS NOT HELD APPLICABLE TO THIS APPELLATE 
HEARING, THIS APPELLANT MAY STILL ACHIEVE THE SAME RESULT 
WITHOUT RELYING UPON THE TAYLOR DECISION. 
The Respondent, in its brief, p. 8, stakes its argument 
on the assumption that the Appellant has sought the retro-
active application of Taylor. Appellant, however, did not 
in his brief rely upon retroactive application of Taylor. 
Although it is shown above that such application of Taylor 
to this case would be entirely proper and desirable, the 
Appellant in his brief recognized that the Taylor opinion 
was void of language making its application either pros-
pective or retrospective. Appellant therefore sought to 
rely upon the entrapment statute itself, Section 76-2-303, 
and other statutes and decisions to show that the applicable 
standard to be applied is the objective standard of entrap-
ment. In other words, Appellant sought to make the same 
arguments which the defendant made in the Taylor case 
itself. As a matter of logic and policy, there is no 
reason why arguments which were successful in Taylor 
should not also be successful here, six months after Taylor. 
Since the adoption of the objective test in Taylor was 
based primarily upon an enlightened and correct reading 
of the applicable statutes, and not upon changes in 
-18-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
circumstances or in policy, there is no reason why the 
Appellant today cannot point to the same statutes and 
receive the same response as the defendant in Taylor. For 
that reason, Taylor is cited in the Appellant's brief only 
for the purpose of referring to the applicable statutes 
and their relevance to the issue here. 
Brief, p. 8. 
See Appellant's 
Nor is the Appellant, having not relied in his Brief 
directly upon the effect of Taylor on this case, which was 
pending on direct appeal at the time of the Taylor decision, 
precluded from enjoying the effect of that decision now. 
For an appellant to have his case fall under the scope of 
a prior judicial decision, it is not necessary for him to 
rely directly upon that decision in his brief. The tribunal 
hearing his appeal is required to apply the law existing 
at the time of its hearing, to the extent allowable, regard-
less of whether or not the appellant directly cites such 
law. In this case, since the Brief of the Respondent and 
the Appellant's Reply have now adequately discussed the 
issue of the relevance of Taylor here, the Appellant there-
fore submits that he is entitled to a judgment based upon 
the "objective" standard of Section 76-2-303, either by 
reason of the holding in the Taylor case or by reason of 
the same arguments made by the defendant in the Taylor 
case. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE STATEMENTS OF THE 
INFORMER WAS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE, REGARDLESS WHETHER 
THE INFORMER WAS TELLING THE TRUTH WHEN HE MADE SUCH 
STATEMENTS TO THE APPELLANT. 
In Point II of the Brief of the Respondent, there is 
a hodge-podge of confusing language concerning the nature 
and admissibility of second-hand statements offered into 
evidence by a witness at trial. The question arises over 
the admissibility, and erroneous exclusion by the trial 
court, of the appellant's testimony concerning statements 
made to him by the informer which the appellant contends 
constituted inducement to commit the offense. Respondent 
contends that if such statements were offered for anything 
but their truth, they would be irrelevant and excludable, 
but if offered for their truth, they would still be hear-
say and excludable. The Respondent then alleges that unless 
the statements were true, they could not show that the 
appellant had been entrapped. His argument creates con-
fusion, however, as to what "statements" he is referring 
to: the statements of the informer to the appellant, or the 
testimony of the appellant at trial as to the fact that 
those statements we-re made. 
For the purpose of clarity, Appellant submits this 
explanation of the proper rules applicable here. First, 
whether the statements made by the informer to the Appel-
lant were true or not is irrelevant. If the informer had 
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said to the Appellant, "Rob that store or I'll kill you," 
and the Appellant had testified to his making of that 
statement, it would be irrelevant for the purpose of the 
entrapment defense whether the informer had spoken truth-
fully, i.e., whether the informer really would have killed 
the Appellant for not robbing the store. The importance 
of the Appellant's testimony would lie, not in the truth 
of the informer's statement, but in the truthfulness of the 
Appellant's testimony that such statements were actually 
made and in the effect that such statements, truthful or 
not, would have had on the Appellant in causing him to obey 
the order. Therefore, for the purpose of relevance, it is 
not necessary for the informer's statement to have been 
true, but only that it had been made. 
Second, it is clear here that the Appellant did not 
wish to prove that what the informer had stated to him was 
true, but rather he only wished to testify that the infor~r 
had made certain statements which, true or not, had induced 
the Appellant to commit the offense. If the Appellant's 
testimony is accepted as true, it proves the making of 
those statements, and is crucial to the issue of entrap-
ment, regardless whether the informer, when he made the 
statements, was telling the truth or merely trying to 
induce the Appellant to commit a crime by telling him lies. 
Thus, it might be said that the Appellant, when testifying 
of the informer's statements, was offering his own testimony 
-21-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
as true, i.e, that the statements were made. But at the 
same time he was not offering the statements themselves 
as true, i.e., that the informer was being truthful when 
he tried to induce the appellant to commit the crime. 
Finally, then, it is clear that the statements offered 
by the Appellant in his testimony were not hearsay, since 
he offered them not to prove their truthfulness but to 
prove their existence. Whether or not the statements were 
true is irrelevant, since the crucial factor is the truth-
fulness of the testimony that they were made and their 
influence on Appellant's behavior. Thus, contrary to the 
Respondent's statement, it is not necessary that the 
informer's statements be true before they would be relevant 
here, and it is proper that the Appellant could testify to 
the fact that those statements were made without affirming 
the truth of those statements. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
SHELDEN R. CARTER 
Utah County Legal 
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